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Abstract
This paper disentangles the e¤ects of corruption on entry mode decision by car-
rying out an empirical analysis with rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish
MNCs around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998. A number of
hypotheses emerge from a simple theoretical framework. The panorama of the results
from the empirical part supports these hypotheses: (i) Corruption has a direct neg-
ative impact on greeneld investments and a weak positive impact on M&As. (ii).
There are complex, asymmetric, secondary e¤ects of corruption on the mode of en-
try. (iii). International experience dampens the e¤ects of corruption on the choice of
entry. (iv) The results are robust to di¤erences in measures of corruption.
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1 Introduction
While foreign direct investment (FDI) ows have the potential to make signicant con-
tributions to economic and social development, there exist widespread perception and
anecdotal evidence that these ows are often restricted by corrupt practices of local or
national government o¢ cials in di¤erent countries around the globe. In e¤ect corruption
acts as a barrier to entry by multinational corporations (MNCs) into new markets.
Corruption is often dened as the misuse of public power for private benet which
includes bribing of the public o¢ cials, kickbacks in public procurement and the misap-
propriation of public funds. Corruption need not involve money changing hands; it may
be observed in the form of "trading inuences"or granting favors. The level of corruption
has two dimensions: The frequency of corrupt undertakings and the total value of bribes
paid -or the magnitude of inuences traded- which go hand in hand, i.e. in countries
where bribery is the rule of the game more than a triing proportion of rm revenues
tend to represent the bribes paid.
Until very recently the lack of systematic data on corruption, coupled with scarcity
and condentiality of rm-level data on FDI, have kept the connection between these two
topics out of the research agenda of economists.
The objective of this paper is to ll this gap in the literature by o¤ering a theoretical
analysis that takes into consideration not just how corruption may restrict FDI ows, but
also how corruption may facilitate these ows and then testing the ndings of the theory
on-site in Sweden by employing a rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish MNCs
around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998.
MNCs undertake foreign direct investment in di¤erent ways: Cross-border M&As,
greeneld investments, joint ventures, partial acquisitions, and di¤erent forms of low-
equity commitment such as sales o¢ ces, licensing, research centers, etc. In this paper,
a multinational may enter a host market by acquiring/merging with an already existing
local rm (cross-border M&As) or by establishing a new venture (greeneld investment).
Alternative is not to enter at all.1
The traditional trade literature is still at its infancy on the subject of e¤ects of cor-
ruption on FDI ows. Except for a few recent studies, this literature has considered the
e¤ects of corruption mainly in the context of whether or not to produce overseas, but has
not di¤erentiated specic types of FDI. This implicitly treats the di¤erent entry modes as
perfect substitutes. However, for most rms seeking foreign market access, cross-border
acquisitions and greeneld investments represent unlikely candidates for perfect substitu-
tion. While acquisitions provide rapid access to a foreign market with increased market
power and a means of exploiting synergies -derived from the non-mobile skills such as
knowledge of the local conditions- between the buyer and seller rms, greeneld invest-
ments o¤er the most protable internal utilization of mobile rm-specic assets (R&D,
marketing expenditures, scientic and technical workers, product newness and complexity
1Due to lack of data, the middle ground between wholly owned operations and no entry could not be
included in the analysis in this paper.
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and product di¤erentiation) for reasons including moral hazard and technology di¤usion.
In 2012, Transparency International conducted a survey on 105 MNCs which are worth
more than $11 trillion. These rms touch the lives of millions of people across the globe.
Of the 105 companies surveyed in the TI report, 50 do not disclose revenue/sales in any
country of foreign operations, 85 do not disclose income tax in any country of foreign
operations and 39 do not disclose any nancial data (tax, revenue, sales, pre-tax income,
capital investment, community contributions) in their countries of operation. Under these
circumstances, it becomes absolutely necessary to rethink the e¤ects of corruption not only
on the national rms, but also on the FDI ows channeled through di¤erent modes of
entry with mode-specic consequences for the countries hosting considerable amounts of
FDI.
First, I o¤er a simple theoretical framework to motivate the empirical analysis. Four
hypotheses are generated. The rst two are related to the direct (primary) e¤ect of
corruption on the mode of foreign expansion: (i) Higher levels of corruption discourage
greeneld investments and (ii) under certain circumstances encourage cross-border M&As.
The last two hypotheses address the indirect (secondary) e¤ects: (iii) Corruption reduces
the likelihood of both M&As and greeneld investments for rms endowed with high levels
of mobile skills and (iv) increases the likelihood of M&As more compared to greeneld
investments for rms equipped with high levels of non-mobile skills.
Main innovations present in the empirical part are as follows: First, I include both
foreign access strategies (cross-border M&As and greeneld investments) in the analy-
sis, which di¤ers from many studies that only include one of the strategies at a time.
Second, I consider not only the primary but also secondary e¤ects of corruption on the
modes of foreign expansion. Third, I apply the multivariate probit model to account for
the correlation between di¤erent entry strategies, which reduces the inconsistency of the
estimators signicantly.
Results of the empirical analysis show that corruption reduces the likelihood of foreign
entry as conjectured by recent studies. Entry mode decision of an MNC is a complex one
and there are many asymmetries involved when it comes to the impact of corruption
on this decision. First, greeneld investments are always discouraged by higher levels of
corruption. This is more so for rms with high levels of mobile skills. Second, M&As are
encouraged by moderate levels of corruption as seen in the OECD countries. For rms
with high levels of non-mobile skills this e¤ect is stronger. However, when corruption levels
are beyond a certain threshold as seen in non-OECD countries, M&As are deterredas well.
Third, rms with a wider network of foreign a¢ liates are more immune to the e¤ects of
corruption, whereas small, single a¢ liate rms are severely a¤ected. These results conrm
the ndings of the recent literature and add to it by testing a number of extensions of
this view.
The paper continues as follows: In the next section, I present the related recent
literature. In Section 3, I lay out a simple model and present the testable hypotheses
generated from it. In section 4, I discuss the econometric analysis. Sections 5 reports the
results and I conclude in Section 6.
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2 The recent literature
There are two strands of literature that are relevant to the analysis of corruption and
entry modes of multinational corporations. The rst one is the literature on foreign
direct investment, too vast to be addressed here at length (Markusen (2002) and citations
therein). The second line of literature relevant for this paper is voluminous as well and
considers the causes and consequences of corruption in general. The work spans many
di¤erent areas such as the impact of corruption on regulatory discretion, existence of rents
and opportunities for rent-seeking, and civil service wage policy. There are also studies
that consider the impact of corruption on various aspects of economic systems such as
growth, military expenditure and procurement, delivery of public services, and inequality.
An excellent survey of this literature is provided by Jain (2001) and Aidt (2003).
There is a limited yet fast growing literature on corruption and FDI connection. The
existing work is mostly empirical and can be summarized under two headings: (i) cor-
ruption acting as the "grabbing hand" in FDI: Corruption in a host country introduces
additional direct or indirect costs for the foreign investor and therefore makes FDI less
likely. This argument nds support in the works of Hines (1995), Wei (2000a, 2000b),
Hellman et al. (2002), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Busse and Hefeker (2007), Hakkala
et al. (2008) and Javorcik and Wei (2009), and (ii) corruption acting as the "helping
hand" in FDI: By greasing squeaky wheels of an ine¢ cient bureaucracy and softening
rigid regulations, corruption can reduce the obstacles in front of FDI and thus will not
necessarily discourage it. The works of Lui (1985), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Saha
(2001), Egger and Winner (2005), Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005), Wu (2006), Tekin-Koru
(2006) and Barassi and Zhou (2012) are examples of this line of study.
The current paper builds on this earlier empirical work examining the e¤ects of cor-
ruption on FDI. Many of these studies use aggregate cross-country data. The fewer ones
using rm-level data usually take steps beyond investigating the e¤ect of corruption on
FDI. Some concentrate of the ownership structure of the rm and some on the di¤erent
types of a¢ liate activity in host country and how they are a¤ected by corruption in the
host country or by the corruption distance between the parent and host countries. Two
such recent studies which are more relevant for the current paper are contributions made
by Javorcik and Wei (2009) and Hakkala, Norback and Svaleryd (2008).
Javorcik andWei (2009) investigate how the volume of FDI and its ownership structure
may be a¤ected by the extent of corruption. They use rm-level data from 22 transition
economies and nd that corruption adversely a¤ects the probability of foreign investments
taking place in the host country. However, conditional on FDI taking place, their results
suggest that joint ventures are more likely in corrupt environments unless the technological
sophistication of the foreign rm is high. Di¤erent from Javorcik and Wei (2009) who
bundle acquisitions and greeneld investments together as sole ownership, in the current
paper I treat them di¤erently since the motives for undertaking an M&A and a greeneld
investment are not the same. Moreover, in the current paper data on global operations of
Swedish multinational rms are used which provides a broader coverage of host countries.
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The most relevant work for the current paper is by Hakkala et al. (2008) who consider
the impact of corruption on FDI in two dimensions: (i) corruption may inuence the
probability that a rm chooses to invest in a foreign market but not the size of the a¢ liate
activities once the investment is undertaken, and (ii) corruption may have di¤erent e¤ects
on di¤erent types of a¢ liate activities such as horizontal, vertical or export platform
sales. Using Swedish rm-level data they nd that rms are less likely to invest in corrupt
countries and horizontal investments are deterred by corruption. There is no robust e¤ect
of corruption on vertical or export platform sales in their ndings. This asymmetry is
explained by greater costs incurred by the rm in case of production for local sales rather
than production for exporting to other markets. They also nd that R&D intensive or
large rms weather corruption better compared to less technical or smaller rms. The
current paper complements Hakkala et al. (2008) by using the same Swedish multinational
rm data to examine another aspect of FDI, namely the e¤ect of corruption on M&As
and greeneld investments undertaken by Swedish MNCs.
3 Corruption and foreign entry - A theoretical framework
This section presents a model of FDI with two countries, the host (H) and the parent
(P ). A MNC from the parent country considers entering the host country market. It can
choose between building its own establishment (greeneld investments, g) or to acquire
an already existing indigenous rm (mergers and acquisition (M&A), m). The outside
alternative for the MNC is not to enter at all (n). Thus,  = fm; g; ng represents the set
of possible entry strategies (s). We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that exporting to
H is not a feasible option due to transport cost reasons.2
Preferences. There exist two nal goods sectors; X (increasing returns, imperfect
competition) and Y (constant returns, perfect competition). Good Y is produced from
a single factor L (Labor), where one unit of L produces one unit of Y . Good X, on the
other hand, is produced using rm specic assets and factor L, both in xed proportions.
The linear demand functions are derived from the quasi-linear utility function maximized
subject to a budget constraint. Income is derived from labor and prots.
maxU = X  


2

X2 + Y (1)
subject to L+  = Y + pX
where L and Y are numéraires. The inverse demand function for good X is as follows:
P =   X (2)
Firms. We assume that there are two (potential) rms producing X in country H,
one from parent country p and one indigenous to host country h.
2The model could be broadened in such a way that the rms choice extends to serving country L by
exporting, which does not alter the principal insights. See Tekin-Koru (2012) for a model with exporting
as as an alternate way of serving the potential host country.
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Firms di¤er in their skills. As in Nocke and Yeaple (2004) there are two types of
rm-specic skills: mobile () and non-mobile (). The e¢ ciency of a rms production
technology is assumed to travel internationally at little to no cost. On the other hand,
the degree of familiarity with the local business conditions is assumed immobile. These
non-mobile skills, including but not limited to the degree of inuence on political process
and of the strength of ties with local bureaucracy, marketing strategies geared towards
the expectations of the host country and greater access to distribution channels a¤ect
both marginal production costs and the xed entry costs as does the level of corruption
() in country H. Variable production costs of rms p and h are given by cp and ch:
cp(s) =

c(p; p; ) if s = g
c(p; h; ) if s = m
(3)
ch(s) = c(h; h; ) for all s (4)
Due to investment in R&D and long term diverse experience in managerial practice,
which are internationally mobile, rm p is endowed with an alternative technology which
allows it to have greater cost advantages in producing good x compared to rm h in cases
of both M&As and greeneld investments. On the other hand, if greeneld investment
is the chosen mode of entry, then rm h enjoys greater cost savings due to being better
acquainted with the local business conditions. Since rm p has access to the non-mobile
skills of the indigenous rm (h) in an M&A regime the size of the cost savings is as
big as the ones enjoyed by rm h in greeneld and no entry regimes. Higher levels of
corruption () in country H will increase the variable costs of production at an increasing
rate. In countries with widespread corruption, for example, the variable costs may reach
prohibitively high levels.3
I also consider the interactions of rm-specic skills with the level of corruption in
country H. Mobile skills get less benecial for the rm as corruption increases whereas
non-mobile skills become much more valuable in the existence of corruption.4 In other
words, high degrees of mobile skills make the MNC less corruption tolerant whereas high
degrees of non-mobile skills make it more corruption tolerant.
In addition to the variable costs, the multinational rm incurs xed entry costs as well.
First, there is a xed greeneld establishment cost (F (g)). Second, there is an M&A cost
(F (m)) if the indigenous rm is acquired.
Last but not least, there is a bureaucratic cost of entry (F b(s) = F b(i; ) for i =
fh; pg) in the host country, H. This cost, F b essentially measures the procedures, time,
cost and paid-in minimum capital required for a rm to start-up and formally operate
in the host country. The regulation of entry enables the regulators to collect bribes
from the potential entrants and serves no social purpose. Therefore, in the model, it is
3The variable productions costs are concave both mobile () and immobile skills () and convex in the
level of corruption (): @c
@p
< @c
@h
< 0; @c
@h
< @c
@p
< 0; @c
@
> 0 and @
2c
@2p
= @
2c
@2
h
> 0; @
2c
@2
h
= @
2c
@2p
> 0;
@2c
@2
> 0
4The cross derivatives of cost functions with respect to di¤erent rm specic assets and the level of
corruption are as follows: @
2c
@p@
> 0; @
2c
@h@
> 0; @
2c
@h@
< 0; @
2c
@p@
< 0:
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assumed that F b increases in corruption. More extensive regulation should be associated
with socially inferior outcomes, particularly corruption. Djankov et. al (2002) nds
evidence supporting the public choice view that entry regulation benets politicians and
bureaucrats. Since it is possible to avoid some if not all of these barriers, a higher degree
of familiarity with the local business/governance conditions will help reducing these costs
by itself and will do even more so in more corrupt environments.5
3.1 The game
Firm ps objective is to maximize prots in the host country through its choice of entry
mode and the quantity supplied. In the rst stage, the MNC chooses its entry mode and
in the second stage makes its quantity decision in a usual Cournot setting by taking the
entry mode from the previous stage as given.
A strategy for rm p has two elements: (i): the rms entry mode choice, s 2  where
 = fm; g; ng is the set of all possible entry nodes and (ii): the rms quantity choice,
xp(s) where xp(s) > 0 indicates that rm p is active in the host country; xp(s) = 0
indicates that rm p chooses n and thus not to produce in country H.
Aggregate supply to the consumers by rms i = fh; pg in the host country given the
entry mode choice s; is:
X(s) =
X
i
xi(s); i = fh; pg (5)
and the aggregate prots generated under each entry strategy s for rms p and h in
country H are given by
p(s; xp(s)) = [(P   cp(s))xp(s)]  F (s)  F b(s) = p(s; xp(s))  F (s)  F b(s) (6)
h(s; xh(s)) = [(P   cp(s))xp(s)] = h(s; xh(s))
where xi(s); ci(s); F (s) and F b(s) are the quantity choice, variable cost of production for
each rm i, xed costs associated with each entry mode s and bureaucratic costs of entry.
i signies the operating prots of rm i = fh; pg. The M&A cost F (m) is endogenized
through a simple bilateral Nash bargaining process.
Bargaining. In this game, the acquiring rm (rm p) and the target rm (rm h)
seek to split a total value p(m)   F b(m) which they can achieve if and only if they
agree on a specic division. If there is no agreement between the rm h and rm p, the
latter opts for the next best alternative among no entry and greeneld investment. The
following payo¤s, thus, can be called backstop payo¤s and be signied by a tilda:
ep = max fp(g);p(n)g (7)eh = maxnh(g) jep=p(g);h(n) jep=p(n)o
5The o¢ cial costs of entry are concave in immobile skills () and convex in the level of corruption ():
@F b
@h
< @F
b
@p
< 0; @F
b
@
> 0 and @
2F b
@2
h
= @
2F b
@2p
> 0; @
2F b
@2
> 0: The cross derivatives @
2F b
@h@
and @
2F b
@p@
are
positive.
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For the solution of this bargaining procedure, it should be assumed that there is a
positive surplus (p(m)   F b(m)   ep   eh > 0) from agreement. If this were not the
case, the whole bargaining process would be unlikely because each side would just take
up its outside opportunity and receives its backstop payo¤. Next, consider the following
rule coming from the solution of bilateral Nash-bargaining process.
Criterion 1 Given  2 [0; 1] each party is to be given its backstop payo¤ plus a share of
the surplus, a fraction  for rm p and a fraction (1  ) for rm h.
Writing p(m) and h(m) for the amounts that rm p and rm h receive, the above
stated bargaining criterion can be translated as
p(m) = ep + (p(m)  F b(m)  ep   eh) = p(m)  F b(m)  F (m) (8)
h(m) = eh + (1  )(p(m)  F b(m)  ep   eh) = F (m)
Next, dene the reservation price of the buying party as Rp = p(m)   F b(m)   ep
and that of the selling party as Rh = eh. Then, one can arrive at the cost of M&A by
solving the equations in (7) for F (m):
F (m) = (1  )Rp + Rh (9)
When  = 1 rm p has all the bargaining power implying that F (m) = Rh: When
 = 0; on the other hand rm p has no bargaining power and thus the cross-border M&A
price is the same as its reservation price, i.e. F (m) = Rp:
Equilibrium. The game is solved in the usual logic of backward induction. I seek
the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. The second stage of the game involves
the product market where rms compete á la Cournot. The equilibrium output levels
and total prots of all rms are reported in the Appendix. Production and sales take
place with rms moving simultaneously. The game is solved for Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. Each equilibrium point is assumed to have equal probability.
Criterion 2 Denote by Xp(s) the set of possible quantity choices for form p in the host
country market given entry mode choice s: The Nash equilibrium for the second-stage
quantity sub-game for any s is the quantity choice xp(s) such that:
p(s; x

p(s))  h(s; xp(s); x p (s)) for all xp(s) 2 Xp(s) (10)
Denote by p(s) the prot to rm p from the Nash equilibrium quantity choice
corresponding to the entry mode choice s: An equilibrium for the rst-stage entry game is
an entry strategy s such that:
p(s
)  p(s; s ) for all s 2  (11)
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The MNC makes its entry decision in the following way. In the case where the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement is no entry, rm p chooses cross-border M&A over no
entry if the payo¤ from cross-border M&A is higher than zero. On the other hand, in the
case where the best alternative is greeneld investment, rm p chooses cross-border M&A
if the payo¤ from M&A is higher than that from greeneld investment. The nal decision
in regard to entry mode, henceforth, will be the outcome of the relative magnitudes
of and the interrelations among country size, level of corruption in the country, rms
relative endowments of mobile and immobile skills, and the relative bargaining power of
the parties.
Considering the current setup of the model, it would be natural to expect a negative
impact of host country corruption on the FDI modes of entry. In other words, as the
corruption level of the host country increases both the variable production costs and
initial start-up costs will get higher and thus discourage the MNC from investing in
the host country all together. However, this argument ignores both the changes in the
acquisition price -which is endogenized in this model- with respect to changes in corruption
and the importance of the MNCs relative endowment of mobile and non-mobile skills.
The corruption tolerance -how well the rm copes with the potential negative impact of
corruption on protability- of a MNC with high levels of mobile skills will be quiet low
compared to a MNC endowed with not to so strong mobile skills but with impressive levels
of non-mobile skills. Therefore, to formalize this discussion I use comparative statics in
the next section.
3.2 Comparative statics
In this section, I analyze the e¤ects of corruption on the entry mode decision of a multi-
national rm to generate testable hypotheses.
3.2.1 Corruption
What is the impact of host country corruption on the equilibrium patterns of greeneld
investments, M&As and no entry at all? To answer this question, I compare the e¤ects of
corruption level () in country H on the payo¤s of rm p from di¤erent entry strategies.
For notational convenience I will henceforth use p(s) for p(s; xp(s)). Before the
total derivative of p(s) for 8s 2  with respect to  is calculated two cases should
be di¤erentiated: The case where greeneld investment is the next best alternative to
M&A and the case where no entry is the next best. The latter is trivial as both variable
production costs and bureaucratic costs of entry will be higher for higher corruption levels.
The payo¤ from greeneld investment to rm p is .
p(g) = p(m)  F b(g)  F (g) (12)
First, take the total derivative of p(g) with respect to  and then substitute the explicit
forms of the payo¤ functions given in Appendix in the general form equations. Finally by
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applying the assumption that @cp@ =
@ch
@ ; arrive at
dp(g)
d
=   2
3
@cp
@
  @F
b(g)
@
< 0 (13)
Given that @F
b(s)
@ > 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 for s 2 fm; gg the above derivative is negative.
Hypothesis 1 Corruption in the host country reduces the likelihood of greeneld invest-
ments.
Next, consider the M&A case. The payo¤ from M&A to rm p is given by
p(m) = p(m)  F b(m)  F (m) (14)
where F (m) = (1  )[p(m)  F b(m) p(g)] + h(g)
Notice that the cost of acquisition is determined by the other parameters of the model.
Taking the total derivative of p(m) with respect to  one can nd the impact of corrup-
tion on the prot of rm p in an M&A scenario:
dp(m)
d
= 
dp(m)
d
+ (1  )dp(g)
d
  dh(g)
d
  @F
b(m)
@
? 0 (15)
Hypothesis 2 Corruption in the host country may increase the likelihood of M&As.
For a larger subset of parameter space the derivative in equation (15) is negative.
Given dp(g)d < 0 and
@F b(s)
@ > 0 and
@cp(s)
@ > 0 for s 2 fm; gg and the Cournot prots
from the Appendix, it is trivial to nd that dp(m)d =  xp(m) @cp@ < 0 and dh(g)d =
 2xh(m)3 @ch@ < 0: However, there is also a possibility that M&A prots are increasing in
the level of corruption. The very last term in equation (15) implies that the indigenous
rm is also hurt by corruption and it works to the advantage of the MNC by reducing the
acquisition price. Parameters may be such that, in equilibrium, this price reduction might
be the dominant factor and corruption might increase the likelihood of M&As compared
to the greeneld investments.
3.2.2 Corruption and mobile skills
I now turn to the issue that how the corruption tolerance of rm p changes as the level of
mobile skills (p) change. Specically, how does the equilibrium pattern changes when the
interaction of the mobile skills with the level of corruption is considered? As stated earlier,
mobile skills provide production cost advantages to the MNC. However, the marginal
impact of these skills gets lower in the existence of rising corruption levels for reasons
such as poor intellectual property right protection. For formal derivation, rst consider
the cross derivative of p(g) given in equation (12) with respect to p and  :
d2p(g)
dpd
=
4
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
  4
3
xp(g)
@2cp
@p@
< 0 (16)
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Given that @cp@p < 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
> 0; the above derivative is negative. Next,
we consider the derivative of dp(m)d given in equation (15) with respect to p. To derive
an expression for it, consider the components of equation (15) one by one. The derivative
of the rst component dp(m)d with respect to p is
d2p(m)
dpd
=
2
32
@cp
@p
@cp
@
  1

xp(m)
@2cp
@p@
< 0 (17)
The derivative of the second component is already given in equation (16). Next, consider
the derivative of dh(g)d
d2h(g)
dpd
=   2
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
+
2
3
xh(g)
@2cp
@p@
> 0 (18)
When all of the components are put together
d2p(m)
dpd
=
4
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
(1 + )  1

@2cp
@p@

xp(m) +
2
3
xh(g) + (1  )xp(g)

< 0 (19)
Given that @cp@p < 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
> 0; equation (19) is negative. I summarize
these results in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 The likelihood of both greeneld investments and the M&As as equilibrium
strategies will decrease as the cost savings through mobile skills shrink in more corrupt
environments. However, the decline in the M&A prots will be more severe.
In more corrupt environments, increases in both greeneld and M&A prots due to
higher endowments of mobile skills will be lower than what they would be for lesser
amounts of corruption. While mobile skills provide variable cost savings for rm p; in-
creasing levels of corruption dampens the e¤ectiveness of these cost savings. This in turn
implies an advantage for the indigenous rm, which will exploit it at the negotiation table
by demanding a higher acquisition price. Therefore, in case of an M&A, rm p will be
hurt due to reduced e¤ectiveness of its mobile skill coupled with an increase in the M&A
entry cost.
3.2.3 Corruption and non-mobile skills
The analysis so far has highlighted the importance of increasing levels of corruption and
the cross e¤ects with mobile skills. I now investigate how the degree of non-mobile skills
endowment with increasing levels of corruption a¤ect the equilibrium mode of entry. For
formal derivation, rst consider the cross derivative of p(g) given in equation (12) with
respect to p and  :
d2p(g)
dpd
=
4
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
  4
3
xp(g)
@2cp
@p@
  @
2F b(g)
@p@
7 0 (20)
10
Given that @cp@p < 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
< 0; the sign of equation (20) is ambiguous
since the rst term on the right hand side is negative whereas the last two terms are
positive. Next, consider the derivative of dp(m)d given in equation (15) with respect to
p = h. Since rm p buys rm h, it adopts rm hs superior non-mobile skills. To derive
an expression for it, we I examine the components of equation (15) one by one. The
derivative of the rst component dp(m)d with respect to p is
d2p(m)
dpd

p=h
=
2
32
@cp
@h
@cp
@
  1

xp(m)
@2cp
@h@
7 0 (21)
The derivative of the second component is already given in equation (20). Next, we
consider the derivative of dh(g)d
d2h(g)
dpd
=   2
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
+
2
3
xh(g)
@2cp
@p@
7 0 (22)
Since all of the components of the second derivative of M&A prots with respect to
non-mobile skills and corruption have ambiguous signs, the sign of d
2p(m)
dpd
is ambiguous,
too.
Hypothesis 4 As long as
 @2cp@p@  >  @cp@p @cp@  the likelihood of both greeneld investments
M&As will increase as the cost savings through non-mobile skills increase in more corrupt
environments. However, for higher  the rise in M&A prots will be higher.
In an M&A what rm p buys is the non-mobile skills () of the indigenous rm as
well. These skills a¤ect both marginal production costs and the xed entry costs as does
the level of corruption () in country H. These skills become more valuable in corrupt
environments. If the discrepancy between the non-mobile skills of the MNC and the
indigenous rm is very high, then the acquisition price will be higher too. Therefore, if
the bargaining strength of the MNC is high then the multinational can negotiate a price
lower than the reservation price of the indigenous rm and at the same time can make
higher prots by using the newly earned superior nonmobile skills in an M&A scenario.
In a way, it is the relative rates of corruption tolerance between these rms which
determines the equilibrium mode of entry. For instance, if the corruption tolerance of
rm p is very high due to superior mobile skills and if it couples with low levels of non-
mobile skill endowments, then the indigenous rm can enjoy a greater advantage. It might
as well be the case that the indigenous rm has all the "right" contacts with the local
bureaucracy and it is going to be costly for the MNC to buy these non-mobile skills. If
the indigenous rm happen to have a high bargaining strength then it might prevent the
entry of the MNC all together and stay as the national monopoly.
In summary, as corruption increases multinational entry gets discouraged. However,
when the importance of skill endowments is considered, multinational rms with rich mo-
bile and non-mobile skills would prefer greeneld investments in corrupt environments.
MNCs with low levels of mobile and non-mobile skills would prefer no entry. Multina-
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tionals with high levels of mobile, but low levels of non-mobile skills would prefer M&A
if the bargaining strength is high. Otherwise, they would go with the greeneld choice or
no entry.
The results of this section lend themselves to empirical testing and I now turn to a
discussion of the empirical analysis and the data set.
4 Econometric analysis
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggests that corruption in
a host country can have asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent ways of serving a foreign market.
The following econometric analysis provides the impact of corruption on foreign entry
modes by using a sample of Swedish multinational rms.
4.1 Econometric model
Hypotheses 1 and 2 in the previous section state that corruption in the host country has
asymmetric e¤ects on a multinationals mode of foreign expansion. While greeneld in-
vestments decline with higher levels of corruption, cross-border M&As can be encouraged
under certain circumstances. I use the following specication to test these predictions:
yikt;s = 0;s + 1;skt + 
0
2;sxit + 
0
3;sxkt + "ikt;s (23)
where yikt;s is a binary indicator if rm is entry into country k during time period t in
the form of s 2 fm; g; ng, kt denotes corruption, xit is a vector of rm-specic variables
(including mobile skills it; non-mobile skills it; bargaining strength it) and xkt is a
vector of country-specic variables (including variable production costs ckt; market size
kt). I also include time and industry xed e¤ects in all specications to account for the
e¤ect of unobservables. Due to data limitations of industry-specic variables for di¤erent
countries, the regressions have no such variables.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 involve more complex, secondary e¤ects of corruption on mode of
foreign entry decision which act through mobile and non-mobile skill endowments of the
multinational rm. To test the predictions of these two hypotheses I include interaction
terms of corruption with mobile and non-mobile skills in expression (23):
yikt;s = 0;s + 1;skt + 2;sktit + 2;sktit + 
0
3;sxit + 
0
4;sxkt + "ikt;s (24)
The most appropriate econometric method to use would be the nested logit model since
the MNC rst gures out the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement and then
enters. However, due to lack of choice specic attributes in the data the nested logit
model becomes useless. Therefore, the empirical part of the paper adopts to the most
general setting where the rm decides if and how to enter. Under the circumstances, the
next best econometric model is a multivariate probit because it allows a exible pattern
of conditional covariance among the latent utilities of alternatives.
12
In this paper, both the bivariate probit and the multivariate probit models are used.
The bivariate probit model is useful in providing the marginal e¤ects for each entry
strategy. First, I estimate e¤ects of corruption on FDI (M&A and greeneld together)
versus no entry, because it would provide a useful comparison to some of the existing
literature that does not take di¤erent entry modes into account. When the bivariate
probit is used for the choice between FDI and no entry, there are two equations (one for
FDI and one for no entry) and two binary dependent variables, yikt;fdi (1 if there is FDI
and 0 otherwise) and yikt;n (1 if there is no entry and 0 otherwise). If the MNC chooses
FDI, then yikt;fdi = 1 and yikt;n = 0. If the MNC chooses not to enter the host market,
then yikt;fdi = 0 and yikt;n = 1.
Then, bivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of corruption on new entry by Swedish multi-
nationals through cross-border M&As and greeneld investments are estimated. Once
more, there are two equations (one for M&As and one for greeneld investments) and two
binary dependent variables, yikt;m (1 if there is an M&A and 0 otherwise) and yikt;g.(1
if there is a greeneld investment and 0 otherwise). If the MNC chooses M&A, then
yikt;m = 1 and yikt;g = 0. If the MNC chooses greeneld investment, then yikt;m = 0 and
yikt;g = 1.
Lastly, when the multivariate probit is used there are three equations (one for m, one
for g and one for n) and three binary variables, yikt;m, (1 if there is m and 0 otherwise)
yikt;g (1 if there is g and 0 otherwise) and yikt;n (1 if there is n and 0 otherwise). If the
MNC chooses m, then (yikt;m = 1, yikt;g = 0, yikt;n = 0), if the MNC chooses g, then
(yikt;m = 0, yikt;g = 1, yikt;n = 0) or if the MNC chooses n, then (yikt;m = 0, yikt;g = 0,
yikt;n = 1).
Error terms "ikt;s are distributed as multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero,
and variance-covariance matrix V , where V has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and
correlations  as o¤-diagonal elements. The multivariate probit model shows structural
similarities to a seemingly unrelated regression model, except that the dependent variables
are binary indicators.
The LR test is used to test the independence of residuals to explore the existence of
nesting possibilities if any.
4.2 The dependent variable
This section provides detailed information on the dependent variable. The data set used
in the paper covers information on the cross-border activities of Swedish MNCs in 42
countries during three distinct time periods: 1987-90, 1991-94 and 1995-98. The country
coverage is determined by the availability of the corruption measure and control variables.
The rm-level data used in this paper is the product of a questionnaire sent to Swedish
MNCs by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (RIIE) in Stockholm, Sweden
about every fourth year since 1960s. The data include all Swedish MNCs in manufacturing
industry and contain detailed information on employment, production, R&D and entry
modes of each majority owned foreign manufacturing a¢ liate. Only the most recent years
are used in this paper due to pronounced changes in the survey questions over time. The
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degree of multinationality varies signicantly in the data. More than half of the rms are
single a¢ liate multinationals. An overwhelming majority of rms have foreign operations
in just a few countries. When a new opportunity to serve a host country arises, this
chance may come to a multinational active in another market.
The denitions of cross-border M&As and greeneld investments are taken from the
RIIE survey. The RIIE asks the following four questions to each foreign a¢ liate: (1)
From what year has the a¢ liate been a production company of the group? (2) Was the
a¢ liate a sales company of the group before the year mentioned above? (3) Did the
a¢ liate operate as a production company of another group before the year mentioned
above? (4) Was the a¢ liate a state-owned company before the year mentioned above? If
the answers to last three questions are all negative, then the investment is classied as a
greeneld investment. If the answer to question 3 is a¢ rmative, then the mode of entry
is a cross-border M&A. The frequency of new a¢ liates transformed from sales companies
of the group and the state-owned enterprise acquisitions is low.
Table 1: Entry characteristics of Swedish MNEs by regions
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
m g m g m g m g
Western Europe 107 21 63 16 42 7 212 44
Major Non-European OECD 18 5 9 3 10 2 37 10
Eastern Europe and Russia 0 0 8 8 2 5 10 13
South and Central America 3 0 2 1 6 2 11 3
Asia / Africa 0 0 2 3 8 6 10 9
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
Cross-border M&As 128 84 68 280
Greeneld Investments 26 31 22 79
No Entry 4676 5387 3690 13753
Number of Firms 115 131 90 330
Number of Countries 42 42 42 42
Table 1 summarizes the foreign expansion transactions by Swedish MNCs between
1987 and 1998. The numbers of cross-border M&As and greeneld investments as well
as the location of these investments in broad regional categories are reported. When
examining this table, several remarks can be made. First, as can be observed in the
bottom half of Table 1, in each time period foreign entry is small when compared to no
entry, which is true for an overwhelming majority of MNCs around the globe. However,
among the two entry modes the total number of M&As is substantially higher than that
of greeneld investment in all three time periods.
Second, observe the top half of Table 1. An overwhelming majority of investments
are in Western Europe followed by major non-European OECD countries. Both M&As
and greeneld investments in these two regions are higher than all the other regions
together. The common denominator of all these countries is their level of development.
FDI goes predominantly to advanced countries where corruption is relatively low, even
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though the share of developing countries has been rising. Apart from lower corruption
levels, developed countries o¤er a large and growing demand coupled with ease of nding
sub-contractors and distribution channels all of which favor entry.
Third and last, developed countries supply a higher number of high quality acquisition
targets. Table 1 shows that Swedish MNCs have considerably higher M&As in Western
Europe and major non-European OECD countries. The preferred mode of entry in devel-
oping countries is not as clear, however. The share of greeneld investments in all entry
modes (calculated by using the last two columns of the top half of Table 1) in developing
countries is 45%, whereas it is only 18% in developed countries.
4.3 Measuring corruption
In this paper, I use corruption indices constructed from survey responses. Whether per-
ceptions of corruption as enunciated by survey responses indeed reect the reality is a
commonly discussed issue. This paper is partial to the idea that although perceptions
may deviate from reality at the margin, there will not be wide divergences.
There is a plethora of corruption indices made available by di¤erent institutions
through surveys conducted. In this paper, I use two di¤erent corruption indices: One
is the so called the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), a long-standing World
Bank research project to develop cross-country indicators of governance and the other
one is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) annually published by Transparency Inter-
national (TI). Both are essentially polls of polls. I rescaled the values between 0 and 100
for comparison purposes, where higher values indicate higher levels of corruption in the
host country.
The more widely known of the two is the CPI which collates results of up to twelve
individual surveys conducted by the World Bank (World Business Environment Survey),
the European Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness Re-
port), the Institute of Management Development, Political and Economic Risk Constancy
in Hong Kong, etc. Many of the same sources used by the WGI are used by the CPI too,
and thus not surprisingly the WGI and the CPI are highly correlated.
The WGI consist of six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance cov-
ering over 200 countries: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism, Government E¤ectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption. The advantage of the WGI measure over others is its lesser sus-
ceptibility to poll -or question- specic idiosyncrasies due to its breadth of coverage and
the variety of sources employed in compiling the index. The main sources for the WGI
are polls conducted by various sources such as Standard and Poors DRI (in conjunction
with McGraw-Hill), the Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services (International
Country Risk Guide), and the World Bank (in conjunction with the University of Basel).
There are of course subtle di¤erences between the questions asked by these sources. Coun-
try coverage is not exactly the same either. However, the survey respondents are divided
between two groups: (i) business people and/or residents of a country, and (ii) experts
(who are asked to rank countries on various dimensions). A composite index for each
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Table 2: The sample of countries, 1987-1998
CC CPI No. of
0-100 0-100 rms No. of No. of
Country 1998 1998 1998 m g
Germany
UK
USA
Denmark
Poland
France
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
6.7
5.4
19.0
2.8
36.7
21.9
2.6
4.6
22.5
39.6
21
13
25
0
54
33
4
10
39
54
28
26
26
25
21
20
18
16
15
15
42
28
29
29
4
16
16
12
9
20
11
4
6
3
10
6
7
0
1
4
Norway
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Austria
China
India
Mexico
Australia
Hungary
Russia
3.6
23.6
50.0
5.2
8.7
55.0
55.7
57.6
14.7
36.9
68.7
10
46
60
8
25
65
71
67
13
50
76
14
14
12
8
8
8
7
6
4
4
4
16
8
6
4
8
3
3
5
3
4
2
3
1
2
3
3
5
1
1
0
1
2
Malaysia
Japan
Czech Republic
Greece
Portugal
Korea
South Africa
Philippines
Ireland
Argentina
38.9
31.4
39.1
28.9
23.3
43.3
37.0
52.9
18.4
53.7
47
42
52
51
35
58
48
67
18
70
4
4
4
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
1
0
1
5
2
1
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
Thailand
Turkey
Colombia
Taiwan
Indonesia
Slovenia
New Zealand
Chile
Venezuela
Iceland
Israel
50.0
61.7
59.0
37.3
71.6
24.0
3.7
22.8
69.1
9.7
24.1
70
66
78
47
80
48
6
32
77
7
29
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
dimension of governance is constructed using these individual surveys through an unob-
served components model.
In this paper, I use the Control of Corruption, CC from the WGI as the main corrup-
tion indicator. It captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture"
of the state by elites and private interests. The CPI is also used as a robustness check.
In the following robustness exercises, I also use other very relevant dimensions of gover-
nance, namely Government E¤ectiveness, GE and Rule of Law, RL. The former captures
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and im-
plementation, and the credibility of the governments commitment to such policies. The
latter captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Table 2 lists all countries included in the sample, the Control of Corruption Index
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in 1998, the Corruption Perception Index in 1998, the number of rms producing there
in 1998, and the sum of all Swedish M&As and greeneld investments in the sample
period. Table 2 does not reveal much about the relationship between corruption and
form of FDI. The bottom of table shows many countries with very high corruption levels
and low levels of Swedish entry. The top part shows low corruption levels coupled with
high degrees of M&As and greeneld investments. However, this may simply reect that
Swedish multinationals mainly invest in developed European countries which also have
lower corruption levels.
4.4 Firm characteristics
The model presented in Section 3 is a highly stylized one written to provide a framework
for the empirical analysis. The controls used in the regressions hereafter are inspired both
from this simple model and the broader FDI literature.
Firm-specic skills. As Markusen (2002) points out, multinationals arise from the use
of knowledge capital, a broad term that includes human capital of employees, patents,
blueprints and procedures, which are called rm specic skills.
Multinationals can reduce their production costs through extensive use of these skills
some of which can be provided to additional plants without reducing their value in existing
plants. I use R&D intensity as a proxy for mobile-skills. Mobile is the MNCs total R&D
expenditures divided by total sales at the end of each time period. High-tech rms are
more dependent on their own technology creation and production technology, and as a
result are more likely to enter by greeneld FDI. Thus, I expect R&D to a¤ect greeneld
investments positively -pointed out by the theory in Section 3 as well.
Some skills, on the other hand, are location specic and cannot travel across borders.
I proxy these non-mobile skills by previous experience in the host country. Non-mobile is
the number of the previous a¢ liates of the MNC in the host country. Non-mobile carries
information about the local knowledge of the rm that is specic to the host country, such
as distribution networks, connections to local bureaucracy, and knowledge of local business
culture. Note that Non-mobile may also represent competitive e¤ects or the bargaining
strength. If the MNC already has a¢ liates in the host country, it may not want to hurt
itself by increasing the competition through a new venture and thus may incline more
towards M&As which eliminate rivals. There is a well-established international business
literature drawing attention to the di¤erential impact of this variable on entry modes.
Previous experience increases the local knowledge and connections of the MNC and thus
may foster greeneld investments over cross-border M&As. On the other hand, it may
also promote M&As because experienced MNCs are able to monitor their partners more
e¤ectively. Therefore, the expected sign is positive for both entry strategies yet the
strength of this e¤ect on each entry mode is ambiguous.
Bargaining strength. Market share of the rm is the most widely used bargaining power
measure in the empirical industrial organization literature. There is a lack of data with
broad industry and country coverage for the market share of a multinational in industry
j in country k in time t. The next best alternative is using the market concentration in
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industry j in country k in time t. OECD STAN database o¤ers concentration measures
for a limited number of countries and sectors from 1980 to 2000. I used these in my early
regressions without much success due to many missing observations and small sample
sizes.
Starting back with Anderson and Gatignon (1986), in the international business and
management strategy literatures, international experience has been cited as an indicator
of low levels of internal uncertainty and greater condence in business dealings and thus
stronger bargaining positions around the negotiation table. Therefore, in this paper, I
assume that multinationals with more international experience are stronger bargainers.
A¤world is the number of the previous a¢ liates of the MNC all around the world and
represents a broad international experience that fosters FDI by MNCs (Caves, 2007).
The expected sign for this variable for both entry modes is positive. However, I expect
a stronger positive for cross-border M&As since international experience is anticipated
to boost the bargaining strength and thus the probability of M&As. I also use rm
size measured by total employment or sales of the rm as an indicator of the bargaining
strength (results not reported in the paper due to brevity but available upon request),
since larger rms with deep pockets are considered to be more experienced and stronger
bargainers (See Caves, 2007).
4.5 Country characteristics
Market size (measured by GDP), infrastructure (measured by telephone mainlines per
one million people,Tel), skill level of the labor force in the host country (measured by the
share of university graduates in the population, Skill), trade openness of the host country
(share of trade volume in GDP, Open) and distance (measured by using the great circle
formula that calculates the minimum distance along the surface of the earth between
Sweden and the host country, Distance) are widely used determinants of entry and are
expected to favor both kinds of entry (Brainard (1997), Carr, Markusen and Maskus
(2001)).
GDP per capita is used to account for the availability of acquisition targets in the host
country because it is a broad measure of general level of development. Even though it is
easier to nd sub-contractors and distribution channels in developed countries, which in
fact favors entry, another important issue is that a developed country supplies a bigger
number of more high quality acquisition targets. It is harder to nd suitable acquisi-
tion targets in less developed countries. Therefore, acquisitions are expected to be more
favorable in countries with high GDP/capita.
Direct costs of entry into the host country are not available in the RIIE data set. I
use the o¢ cial time it takes to start-up a new rm in the host country as presented in
Djankov et al. (2002), Time, as proxy for xed entry costs.
The country-level data are collected from the International Financial Statistics of IMF
and the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank. More information
about variables as well as summary statistics and a correlations table are provided in the
Appendix.
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Table 3: FDI versus No Entry
Bivariate Probit
Estimates Marginal e¤ects
Entry mode fdi n fdi n
Corruption
-1.08**
(0.543)
1.94***
(0.367)
-0.096**
(0.043)
0.386***
(0.132)
Mobile
0.165*
(0.982)
-9.259***
(1.128)
0.015**
(0.006)
-0.684***
(0.302)
Non-mobile
0.095**
(0.042)
0.036
(0.056)
0.012**
(0.059)
0.022
(0.019)
A¤world
0.022***
(0.0002)
0.004
(0.037)
0.002***
(0.0001)
0.003
(0.025)
Time
-0.763*
(0.455)
0.523
(0.654)
0.021*
(0.013)
0.018
(0.027)
GDP
0.075***
(0.036)
-0.067***
(0.016)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.022***
(0.008)
GDP/capita
0.004
(0.008)
0.045***
(0.005)
0.0003
(0.0005)
0.016***
(0.003)
Open
-0.073
(0.151)
-0.154*
(0.086)
-0.006
(0.013)
-0.010*
(0.061)
Tel
0.875**
(0.452)
0.934
(0.754)
0.056**
(0.029)
0.414
(0.327)
Distance
-0.125**
(0.059)
0.168**
(0.081)
-0.134**
(0.061)
0.023**
(0.009)
Skill
0.156***
(0.038)
-0.196***
(0.031)
0.015***
(0.026)
-0.073***
(0.007)
Observations 13,258
Wald 2 1354
 -0.854
LR test of 548.5
indep. of eq. (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a
constant, time, and industry xed e¤ects.
5 Results
5.1 FDI decision alone
Other than a few exceptions an overwhelming majority of the existing work on the e¤ects
of corruption on foreign direct investment makes no distinction between the modes of
foreign entry. Therefore, in this subsection I begin with the bivariate probit estimates of
the e¤ects of corruption on both types of FDI by the Swedish multinational corporations
to put the results in perspective with the existing literature. Another advantage of using
the bivariate probit model because it comes with the benet of being able to calculate
the marginal e¤ects for each entry strategy.6
The rst two columns in Table 3 present the coe¢ cient estimates while the last two
6The computationally cumbersome multivariate probit model module written by Capellari and Jenkins
(2003) in STATA does not involve marginal e¤ects computations. Capellari and Jenkins (2003) present
a comparison of bivariate probit (maximum likelihood estimation) to their multivariate probit (simulated
maximum likelihood estimation) analysis and come to a conclusion that as long as the number of random
draws and the sample size are large enough the two methods yield very similar predictions. Since these
two conditions are satised in the estimations in this paper, I use bivariate probit estimation to give a
avor of the economic size of the estimates.
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columns report the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the success probability of
each strategy. All regressions include a constant, time, and industry xed e¤ects. Wald
2 is 1354 indicating a good t. Correlation coe¢ cient  is signicant revealing that fdi
and n are not independent from each other as strategies.
Corruption proxied by the Control of Corruption measure from the WGI database is
signicantly negative in equation fdi (column 1) and positive and signicant in equation
n (column 2), revealing that higher levels of corruption in a host country discourage
FDI by Swedish multinationals. This is in line with Hakkala et al. (2008) and Javorcik
and Wei (2009) as well as the previous literature where researchers generally have found
a signicant negative e¤ect of corruption on multinational entry without di¤erentiating
between di¤erent entry modes using aggregate data.
Turning to economic size of the estimated parameters, calculations of marginal e¤ects
show that a small increase in Corruption reduce the probability of FDI by 9.6%. Although
this is not large in absolute magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the
sample mean of 2.7% (the success probability of FDI in the sample), this is nevertheless
economically meaningful.
Mobile skills of the multinational increase the likelihood of fdi with a small marginal
e¤ect but reduces the odds for n with a marginal e¤ect of -68.4%. Experience in the host
country (Non-mobile) measured as the number of previous a¢ liates in the host country
have no e¤ect on probability of no entry however, it increases the likelihood of FDI. The
marginal e¤ects are rather small.
International experience (A¤world), infrastructure (Tel), market size (GDP) and la-
bor skill in the host country (Skill) increase the likelihood of FDI as expected while FDI
declines in distance (Distance). Trade openness of the host country (Open) and time that
its takes to start a new business (Time) are not signicant.
5.2 M&As versus greeneld investments
Before the joint estimation of M&As, greeneld investments and no entry, I turn to the
bivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of corruption on new entry by Swedish multinationals.
The rst two columns in Table 4 present the coe¢ cient estimates whereas the last two
columns include the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the success probability of
M&As and greeneld investments. All regressions include a constant, time, and industry
xed e¤ects. Wald 2 is 452 indicating a good t. Correlation coe¢ cient  is signicant
revealing that A and G are not independent from each other as strategies.
Corruption is positive and signicant at 10% in equation m (column 1) and negative
and highly signicant in equation g (column 2), revealing that higher levels of corruption
in the host country may grease the squeaky wheels in case of M&As while discouraging
greeneld investments conducted by Swedish multinationals. This signicant and positive
corruption e¤ect on M&As is a new result.
None of the recent studies concentrates on M&As at the rm level, however, among
recent studies focusing on joint ventures Javorcik and Wei (2009) nd in highly corrupt
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Table 4: MAs versus Greeneld Investments
Bivariate Probit
Estimates Marginal e¤ects
Entry mode m g m g
Corruption
1.43*
(0.816)
-2.14***
(0.719)
0.095*
(0.054)
-0.164***
(0.047)
Mobile
-1.65
(1.56)
5.96***
(1.56)
-0.125
(0.093)
0.103***
(0.028)
Non-mobile
0.106**
(0.042)
-0.128
(0.099)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
A¤world
0.015***
(0.003)
0.022***
(0.004)
0.001***
(0.0001)
0.0003***
(0.00007)
Time
-0.254
(0.389)
-0.434
(0.527)
-0.011
(0.017)
0.008
(0.021)
GDP
0.064***
(0.024)
0.039*
(0.021)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.0005
(0.0004)
GDP/capita
0.018**
(0.009)
0.007
(0.018)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.0002
(0.0003)
Open
-0.157
0.196
0.427*
(0.258)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.008*
(0.005)
Tel
1.22*
(0.745)
0.035
(1.08)
0.057*
(0.028)
-0.0005
(0.004)
Distance
-0.096*
(0.057)
-0.178**
(0.075)
-0.084*
(0.051)
-0.031**
(0.015)
Skill
0.211***
(0.057)
0.184
(0.111)
0.020***
(0.006)
0.012
(0.009)
Observations 13,258
Wald 2 452
 -0.563
LR test of 8.53
indep. of eq. (0.01)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a
constant, time, and industry xed e¤ects.
environments conditional on entry joint ventures will be the chosen mode of entry rather
than a wholly owned subsidiary. The initial result here is consistent with their nding.
Calculating the marginal e¤ects shows that an innitesimal increase in Corruption
increases the probability of an M&A by 9.5%. Again, although this seems small in absolute
magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the sample mean of 2% (the success
probability of M&As in the sample), this is economically meaningful. The same marginal
e¤ect for a greeneld investment is 16.4%. In other words, a small increase in corruption
reduces the likelihood of a greeneld project by about 16%.
Firm-specic assets measured by Mobile and Non-mobile. The results indicate that
while Mobile increases the odds in favor of g with a marginal e¤ect of 10.3%, Non-mobile
increases the likelihood of m with a marginal e¤ect of only 0.5%,
Turning to other coe¢ cient estimates in the rst two columns of Table 4, international
experience (A¤world) and market size (GDP) increase the likelihood of both kinds of
entry. The host country GDP per capita and the skill level, respectively proxied by
GDP/capita and Skill increase the odds in favor of M&As only. All of these have relatively
small marginal e¤ects on the mode of entry. Trade openness of the host country (Open),
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host country infrastructure (Tel) and time that its takes to start a new business (Time)
are mostly insignicant for both types of entry.
5.3 Joint estimation of M&As, greeneld investments and no entry
Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of corruption
on the probability of conducting m, g or n. The rst three columns report the baseline
specication without the interaction terms as in Equation (23), whereas the last three
columns present results with the interaction terms as in Equation (24). Wald 2 for the
rst specication is 1051 and for the second is 1167 indicating a good t.
Also notice that the correlation coe¢ cient between m and g (mg) is almost insignif-
icant, whereas that between m and n (mn) and g and n (gn), are both signicantly
di¤erent from zero. This suggests a nested structure where foreign entry decision is made
rst and then the mode of entry is chosen. However, due to the lack of choice specic
attributes in the data set, the use of a nested logit models is not possible.
In Table 5, in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, the variable of interest, Corruption,
increases the likelihood of cross-border M&As and reduces the odds of greeneld invest-
ments. The probability of no entry also goes up in Corruption, which suggests that
cross-border M&As and no entry have a complementary response to changes in corrup-
tion. The results in Table 5 are broadly consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 4.
Most of the other covariates exhibit their expected signs, though some are insignicant.
Throughout almost all equations A¤world have signicant positive signs for both cross-
border M&As and greeneld investments, pointing out that Swedish MNCs with a wider
network and more international experience have a higher chance of entering new markets
to serve those markets. In short, broad international experience matters.
Swedish MNCs with high Mobile skills favor greeneld investments. On the other
hand, Non-mobile always favors cross-border M&As and reduces to odds against greeneld
investments, which suggests that Swedish MNCs endowed with stronger connections to
local bureaucracy or knowledge of local business culture prefer cross-border M&As to
greeneld FDI. This may also be interpreted as Swedish MNCs with more bargaining
power derived from their previous experience in the host market acquire local rms rather
than establishing wholly owned subsidiaries.
In the baseline specication, the e¤ect of corruption on greeneld investments is sig-
nicant and negative as expected by the FDI literature. The same variable has quite a
di¤erent e¤ect on cross-border M&As; it is signicant only at 10% nonetheless positive.
On the one hand, it is highly preferable to overtake a local rm with all its knowledge
about the host country conditions particularly in countries with high levels of corruption.
On the other hand, if the MNC is endowed with high levels of mobile skills such as techno-
logical sophistication then a local partner may open the door for leakage of these valuable
mobile skills when corruption is high. This necessitates the introduction of interaction
terms of Corruption with Mobile and Non-mobile skills in the regressions.
In the last three columns of Table 5, I examine whether e¤ects of corruption vary across
the skills set of the MNC to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 of the theory. To this e¤ect I add
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Table 5: No Entry versus MAs versus Greeneld Investments
Multivariate Probit
Baseline Interactions
Entry mode m g n m g n
Corruption 1.38*(0.804)
-2.26***
(0.711)
1.94***
(0.354)
1.12*
(0.652)
-2.12***
(0.702)
1.82***
(0.394)
Corruption x Mobile -0.821**(0.392)
-1.85***
(0.254)
0.564
(0.483)
Corruption x Non-mobile 1.36***(0.254)
0.962*
(0.562)
-0.129
(0.268)
Mobile -1.03(1.43)
4.66***
(2.06)
9.42***
(1.27)
-1.07*
(0.650)
4.39***
(1.03)
9.24***
(1.25)
Non-mobile 0.097**(0.043)
-0.194**
(0.092)
0.029
(0.027)
0.168***
(0.042)
-0.130*
(0.071)
-0.028
(0.087)
A¤world 0.017***(0.003)
0.022***
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.126***
(0.024)
0.025***
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.003)
Time -0.215(0.365)
-1.32*
(0.742)
0.532
(0.682)
-0.218
(0.305)
-1.27*
(0.709)
0.596
(0.736)
GDP 0.063***(0.024)
0.029*
(0.016)
-0.067***
(0.016)
0.062***
(0.021)
0.032*
(0.017)
-0.066***
(0.012)
GDP/capita 0.017**(0.008)
0.007
(0.018)
0.040***
(0.008)
0.018**
(0.008)
0.007
(0.018)
0.048***
(0.008)
Open -0.1470.245
0.458
(0.395)
-0.144*
(0.086)
-0.095
0.129
0.362
(0.347)
-0.109*
(0.059)
Tel 1.27*(0.735)
0.042
(0.095)
0.987
(0.765)
0.925*
(0.534)
0.028
(0.084)
0.832
(0.782)
Distance -0.085*(0.059)
-0.172**
(0.071)
0.188**
(0.081)
-0.087*
(0.052)
-0.170**
(0.075)
0.176*
(0.098)
Skill 0.225***(0.043)
0.144
(0.165)
-0.173***
(0.047)
0.212***
(0.037)
0.104
(0.171)
-0.164***
(0.059)
Time e¤ects
Industry e¤ects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations 13,258 13,258
Wald 2 1051 1167
Correlation.
mg
0.125
(0.089)
0.143*
(0.086)
mn
-0.945***
(0.068)
-0.866***
(0.058)
gn
-0.397***
(0.062)
-0.399***
(0.041)
LR test of 347 362
indep. of eq. (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time and industry xed e¤ects.
the interaction of corruption variable with mobile and non-mobile skills to the previous
specication. As expected in Hypotheses 3 and 4, the negative impact of corruption on
greeneld investments gets stronger with higher levels of mobile skills and weaker with
higher levels of non-mobile skills. In other words, a multinational with sophisticated
technology or novel marketing ideas is a¤ected much more severely by corruption than a
less sophisticated one. If this same multinational has rich knowledge of local conditions
through its previous a¢ liates in the host country then the adverse e¤ects of corruption
shrink for this rm.
In case of M&As the direct and weak positive impact of corruption gets lower if high
levels of mobile skills are involved. This may be due to leakage of technology when the
multinational acquires or merges with a local rm. However, the favorable impact of cor-
ruption on M&As gets even stronger if the multinational is already endowed with a good
knowledge of local conditions. In other words, in corrupt environments, a multinational
with high non-mobile skills chooses to enter the host country through an M&A because
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that way it can employ its own knowledge of that market -if any and internalize the local
knowledge of the acquired local rm as well.
One important remark here is that it is obvious that corruption has direct e¤ects on
a rms mode of foreign entry, however, these e¤ects gain more depth and meaning when
the indirect or secondary e¤ects of corruption realized through mobile and non-mobile
skills of the rm are brought into the picture.
5.4 Robustness
Table 6 reports the specication with interactions using di¤erent measures of corruption.
For brevity only the corruption terms are reported. Estimated values of the other variables
are broadly consistent with Table 5.
The rst three columns report the multivariate probit results with widely used CPI of
Transparency International. The next three columns present the results with Government
E¤ectiveness measure from WGI and the last three columns show the regressions with
Rule of Law measure again from WGI. Results are very similar to the ones in Table 5.
If anything, estimates with Government E¤ectiveness and Rule of Law exhibit stronger
secondary e¤ects.
Next, I turn my attention to OECD countries as Swedish MNCs mainly invest in de-
veloped countries which also have lower corruption levels than average country. Swedish
MNCs invest in nearby developed countries because they have lots of potential M&A
targets, and these countries just happen to have low levels of corruption cross-sectionally.
Even though there are country-level regressors to control for level of development of a
country in previous estimations, a more compelling experiment is to restrict the sample
to these developed countries only to avoid potentially spurious results. The rst three
columns of Table 7 report these results. Corruption is again proxied by Control of Cor-
ruption measure from WGI. Notice that even though the signs remain the same there
is a marked decline in the signicance of the estimated corruption parameters for the
sub-sample of OECD countries.
When I restrict the sample to non-OECD countries (columns 4-6 of Table 7), strong
direct e¤ects of corruption are observed for all entry strategies while secondary e¤ects re-
alized through mobile and non-mobile skills remain important. One very notable change
in this set of regressions is the ip in the sign of Corruption in the m equation (Col-
umn 4) which suggests that higher levels of corruption reduce the likelihood of M&As
in non-OECD countries. In other words, as corruption levels pass a certain threshold
the multinationals likelihood of both kinds of entry declines. This result is in line with
Javorcik and Wei (2009).
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The very nal exercise is restricting the sample to large rms only, although this limits
a lot of the time series variation in the sample. For the purposes of this exercise a large
rm is dened as a rm with 10 or more a¢ liates around the globe.7 The results are
reported in the last three columns of Table 7. The direct e¤ects of corruption are smaller
both in size and signicance. Secondary e¤ects are still strong. Multi-a¢ liate MNCs
have better and wider distribution networks around the globe and most importantly more
international experience. Therefore, the M&As and greeneld investments conducted by
these rms might be less prone to changes in corruption. In short, endowment of mobile
and non-mobile skills as well as the degree of multinationality matter for how profound
the e¤ect of corruption will be on the mode of entry.
6 Conclusion
In the last decade, corruption has become an eminent item on the agenda of the in-
ternational institutions. The UN Convention against Corruption, adopted in Mexico in
December 2003 is the rst global instrument embracing a comprehensive range of anti-
corruption measures to be taken at the national level. According to the OECD Convention
of Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢ cials in International Business Transactions,
which was signed in 1997, and went into e¤ect in 1999, bribery of foreign o¢ cials by rms
from member countries is a crime. The 15th International Anti-Corruption Conference
(IACC) was completed in November 2012 with record participation from 140 countries
and the main message of the conference was ending impunity.
In this paper, I attempt to disentangle the e¤ects of corruption on entry mode deci-
sion by carrying out an empirical analysis with rich, rm-level data on the activities of
Swedish MNCs around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998. A num-
ber of hypotheses emerge from a simple theoretical framework. As corruption increases
multinational entry gets discouraged. Corruption reduces the likelihood of greeneld in-
vestments while increasing the odds in favor of cross-border M&As. Multinational rms
with rich mobile and non-mobile skills would prefer greeneld investments in corrupt en-
vironments. MNCs with low levels of mobile and non-mobile skills would prefer no entry.
Multinationals with high levels of mobile, but low levels of non-mobile skills would prefer
M&As if the bargaining strength is high. Otherwise, the greeneld investments or no
entry will be chosen.
The panorama of the results presented in the previous section shows the following: (i)
Corruption has a direct negative impact on greeneld investments and a weak positive
impact on M&As. (ii). There are complex, asymmetric, secondary e¤ects of corruption
on the mode of entry. (iii). International experience dampens the e¤ect of corruption on
the mode of entry. (iv) The results are robust to di¤erences in measures of corruption.
7Other thresholds (2 or more and 5 or more) are used in the estimations and the results are qualitatively
similar.
26
References
[1] Aidt, T. (2003) Economic Analysis of CorruptionEconomic Journal, 113(491): 632-52.
[2] Anderson, E. and H. Gatignon (1986) "Modes of Foreign Entry: A Transaction Cost Analysis
and Propositions" Journal of International Business Studies, 17(3): 1-26.
[3] Barassi, M.R. and Y. Zhou (2012) The Impact of Corruption on FDI: A Parametric and
Non Parametric Analysis European Journal of Political Economy, 28(3): 30212.
[4] Bjorvatn, K. and T. Soreide (2005) "Corruption and Privatization" European Journal of
Political Economy, 21(4): 903-14.
[5] Brainard, L. (1997) An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Trade-o¤
between Multi-national Sales and TradeAmerican Economic Review, 87: 520-45.
[6] Busse, M. and C. Hefeker (2007) Political Risk Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment
European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2): 397-415.
[7] Cappellari, L. and S. Jenkins (2003) "Multivariate Probit Regression Using Simulated Max-
imum Likelihood" Stata Journal, 3(3): 278-94.
[8] Carr, D., J. Markusen and K. Maskus (2001) Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of
the Multi-national EnterpriseAmerican Economic Review ,91: 693-708.
[9] Caves, R. (2007) Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge University
Press.
[10] Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2002) "The Regulation Of
Entry" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1): 1-37.
[11] Egger, P.H. and H. Winner (2005) How Corruption Inuences Foreign Direct Investment:
A Panel Data StudyEconomic Development and Cultural Change, 54(2): 459-86.
[12] Habib, M. and L. Zurawicki (2002) Corruption and Foreign Direct InvestmentJournal of
International Business Studies, 33: 291-308.
[13] Hakkala, K., P-J. Norbäck and H. Svaleryd (2008) Asymmetric E¤ects of Corruption on
FDI: Evidence from Swedish Multinational FirmsThe Review of Economics and Statisitics,
90(4): 627-42.
[14] Hellman, J.S., G. Jones and D. Kaufmann (2002) Far From Home: Do Foreign Investors
Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?mimeo.
[15] Hines, J. (1995) Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business after 1977
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5266.
[16] Jain, A. K. (2001) Corruption: A ReviewJournal of Economic Surveys, 15(1): 71-121.
[17] Javorcik, B. and S-J. Wei (2009) "Corruption and Cross-border Investment in Emerging
Markets: Firm-level Evidence" Journal of International Money and Finance, 28(4): 605-24.
[18] Lui, F. (1985) An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery Journal of Political Economy,
93(4): 76081.
[19] Markusen, J. (2002) Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, MIT Press.
[20] Nocke, V. and S. Yeaple (2004) "An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment"
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper: 11003.
[21] Saha, B. (2001) Foreign Investment, Financial Markets and Industry: India in the 1990s
mimeo.
27
[22] Tekin-Koru, A. (2006) Corruption and the Ownership Composition of the Multinational
Firm at the Time of Entry: Evidence from Turkey Journal of Economics and Finance,
30(2): 251-69.
[23] Tekin-Koru, A. (2012) Asymmetric E¤ects of Trade Costs on Entry Modes: Firm Level
EvidenceEuropean Economic Review, 56(2): 277-94.
[24] Wheeler, D. and A. Mody (1992) International Investment Location Decisions: The Case
of U.S. FirmsJournal of International Economics, 33: 5776.
[25] Wei, S. (2000) How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?Review of Economics
and Statistics, 82(1): 1-11.
[26] Wu, S. (2006) Corruption and Cross-border Investment by Multinational FirmsJournal of
Comparative Economics, 34: 839-56.
Appendix
Aggregate prot to rms p and h from sales in the host country for entry mode s and quantity
choice xi(s) can be expressed respectively as follows:
p(s; xp(s)) = [(  X(s)  cp(s))xp(s)]  F (s)  F b(s) (A.1)
h(s; xh(s)) = [(  X(s)  ch(s))xh(s)] (A.2)
where X(s) = xp(s) +xh(s). When s = m, xh(s) = 0 and when s = n, xp(s) = 0: Maximizing
(A.1) and (A.2) with respect to xp(s) and xh(s) in that order and solving for xp(s) and xh(s) in
the rst order conditions gives the equilibrium prot levels for each rm as
p(s; xp(s)) = [xp(s)]
2   F (s)  F b(s) (A.3)
h(s; xh(s)) = [xh(s)]
2 (A.4)
where
xp(s) =
  2cp(s) + ch(s)
3
(A.5a)
xp(s) =
  2ch(s) + cp(s)
3
if 2 rms are active (A.5.b)
or
xi(s) =
  2ci(s)
2
if only 1 rm is active (A.6)
where i = (p; hg.
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